Here is an excellent piece from Dennis Fisher (currently writing for decipher) covers our new LLM Architectural Risk Analysis. Dennis always produces accurate and tightly-written work.
This article includes an important section on data feudalism, a term that BIML coined in an earlier Decipher article:
“Massive private data sets are now the norm and the companies that own them and use them to train their own LLMs are not much in the mood for sharing anymore. This creates a new type of inequality in which those who own the data sets control how and why they’re used, and by whom.
‘The people who built the original LLM used the whole ocean of data, but then they started dividing [the ocean] up, [leading] to data feudalism. Which means you can’t build your own model because you don’t have access to [enough] data,’ McGraw said.”
The Register has a great interview with Ilia Shumailov on the number one risk of LLMs. He calls it “model collapse” but we like the term “recursive pollution” better because we find it more descriptive. Have a look at the article.
Our work at BIML has been deeply influenced by Shumailov’s work. In fact, he currently has two articles in our Annotated Bibliography TOP 5.
[LLMtop10:1:recursive pollution] LLMs can sometimes be spectacularly wrong, and confidently so. If and when LLM output is pumped back into the training data ocean (by reference to being put on the Internet, for example), a future LLM may end up being trained on these very same polluted data. This is one kind of “feedback loop” problem we identified and discussed in 2020. See, in particular, [BIML78 raw:8:looping], [BIML78 input:4:looped input], and [BIML78 output:7:looped output]. Shumilov et al, subsequently wrote an excellent paper on this phenomenon. Also see Alemohammad. Recursive pollution is a serious threat to LLM integrity. ML systems should not eat their own output just as mammals should not consume brains of their own species. See [raw:1:recursive pollution] and [output:8:looped output].
Another excellent piece, this time in the politics, policy, business and international relations press is written by Peter Levin. See The real issue with artificial intelligence: The misalignment problem in The Hill. We like the idea of a “mix master of ideas” but we think it is more of a “mix master of auto-associative predictive text.” LLMs do not have “ideas.”
What’s the difference (philosophically) between Adversarial AI and Machine Learning Security? Once again, Rob Lemos cuts to the quick with his analysis of MLsec happenings. It helps that Rob has actual experience in ML/AI (unlike, say, most reporters on the planet). That helps Rob get things right.
We were proud to have our first coverage come from Rob in darkreading.
My favorite quote: “Those things that are in the black box are the risk decisions that are being made by Google and Open AI and Microsoft and Meta on your behalf without you even knowing what the risks are,” McGraw says. “We think that it would be very helpful to open up the black box and answer some questions.”
“To properly secure machine learning, the enterprise needs to be able to do three things: find where machine learning is being used, threat model the risk based on what was found, and put in controls to manage those risks.
‘We need to find machine learning [and] do a threat model based on what you found,’ McGraw says. ‘You found some stuff, and now your threat model needs to be adjusted. Once you do your threat model and you’ve identified some risks and threats, you need to put in some controls right across all those problems.’
There is no one tool or platform that can handle all three things, but McGraw happens to be on the advisory boards for three companies corresponding to each of the areas. Legit Security finds everything, IriusRisk helps with threat modeling, and Calypso AI puts controls in place.
‘I can see all the parts moving,’ McGraw says. ‘All the pieces are coming together.'”
Apparently there are many CISOs out there who believe that their enterprise policies prohibit the use of ML, LLMS, and AI in their organization. Little do they know what’s actually happening.
BIML provided a preview of our upcoming LLM Risk Analysis work (including the top ten LLM risks) at a Philosophy of Mind workshop in Rio de Janeiro January 5th. The workshop was organized by David Chalmers (NYU) and Laurie Paul (Yale).
Once you learn that many of your new applications have ML built into them (often regardless of policy), what’s the next step? Threat modeling, of course. Irius Risk, the worldwide leader for threat modeling automation, announced a threat modeling library covering ML risks identified by BIML on October 26, 2023.
This is the first tool in the world to include ML risk as part of threat modeling automation. Now we’re getting somewhere.
Darkreading was the first publication to cover the news, and remains the best source for cutting edge stories about machine learning security. Read the original story here.
Much of what the executive order is trying to accomplish are things that the software and security communities have been working on for decades, with limited success.
“We already tried this in security and it didn’t work. It feels like
we already learned this lesson. It’s too late. The only way to
understand these systems is to understand the data from which they’re
built. We’re behind the eight ball on this,” said Gary McGraw, CEO of
the Berryville Institute of Machine Learning, who has been studying software security for more than 25 years and is now focused on AI and machine learning security.
“The big data sets are already being walled off and new systems can’t
be trained on them. Google, Meta, Apple, those companies have them and
they’re not sharing. The worst future is that we have data feudalism.”
Another challenge in the effort to build safer and less biased models
is the quality of the data on which those systems are being trained.
Inaccurate, biased, or incomplete data going in will lead to poor
results coming out.
“We’re building this recursive data pollution problem and we don’t
know how to address it. Anything trained on a huge pile of data is going
to reflect the data that it ate,” McGraw said. “These models are going
out and grabbing all of these bad inputs that in a lot of cases were
outputs from the models themselves.”
“It’s good that people are thinking about this problem. I just wish
the answer from the government wasn’t red teaming. You can’t test your
way out of this problem.”